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I.

THE PROBLEM OF THE HIGH SEAS

Any study of the nature of conflicting State interests in the waters
denominated as territorial sea or high seas can be expected to lose
validity after only a short period of time because the law has been
changing so rapidly that it is obsolete by the time the printers have set
it in black letter. This is especially true where environmental concerns
are involved. Nevertheless, it is always appropriate to begin with first
principles developed by the father of international law.
Et. . . commune est omnium Maris Elementum, infinitum scilicet ita,
ut possideri non queat, et omnium usibus accomodatum: sive navigationem respicimus, sive etiam piscaturam.
Mare igitur proprium omnino alicuius fieri non potest, quia natura
commune hoc esse non permittit, sed iubet . . . ut si quid earum

rerum per naturam occupari possit, id eatenus occupantis fiat, quatenus ea occupatione usus ille promiscuus non laeditur.'
A famous Admiralty judge, Lord Stowell (then Sir William Scott)
restated the principle of freedom of the seas from Grotius in the case
of a French vessel engaged in the slave trade that had been intercepted
on the high seas by a British vessel, but was ordered to be released
because the British vessel had no right to stop and search. In that case
the court said:
• . . all nations being equal, all have an equal right to the uninterrupted use of the unappropriated parts of the ocean for their navigation. In places where no local authority exists, where the subjects of
*Professor of Law Fordham University School of Law. A.B. Harvard (1954); J.D. Boston
University (1957); LL.M. Columbia (1963).
1H. GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM 28-30 (R. Magofin transl. 1916).
For . . . the sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become a
possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of all, whether we consider
it from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries.
Therefore the sea can in no way become the private property of any one, because
nature not only allows but enjoins its common use. . . If any part of these things is
by nature susceptible of occupation, it may become the property of the one who occupies
it only so far as such occupation does not affect its common use.
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all states meet upon a footing of entire equality and independence, no
one state, or any of its subjects, has 2a right to assume or exercise
authority over the subjects of another.
The principle of freedom of the high seas enunciated by Grotius and
interpreted by Lord Stowell is the theoretical foundation of the denial
to any state, other than the state of the vessel's flag, of any right to
interfere with the operations of a vessel on the high seas. It is a vital
principle enshrined in the writings of the most important jurists.'
Recently, the late Wolfgang Friedmann succinctly summarized, the old
law in a different context:
As a general principle of international law the freedom of the seas is
less than three and one-half centuries old. It protects the surface of the
seas, with the exception of territorial waters, from appropriation or
exclusive use by any one state. * ** Except in times of war, the major
maritime powers have always been supporters of the freedom of the
seas since their navies were able to protect their commercial interests,
including in most cases, their overseas colonies, their merchant fleets,
and their fishermen. Between them they were powerful enough to
maintain this freedom as a general doctrine of international law.,
When we turn from the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists to the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice we find
recognition of the broad principle of freedom of the seas in the Fisheries
Case,' yet that same decision also began the process of coastal State
extension into the high seas6 that has fostered the principle of the natural
'The Le Louis, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1475 (Adm. 1817).
'C. COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 47-86, 285-463 (6th ed. 1967); 1 G. GIDEL,
LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 480-84 (1932); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133-39 (5th ed. 1967); M. McDOUGAL and W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC
ORDER OF THE OCEANS 730-998 (1962); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 582-608 (8th ed.
H. Lauterpacht 1955); 1 P. FAUCHILLE, TRAIT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 1021 (8th ed.
by Bonfils 1925); P. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 75112 (1927): 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 704-27 (1965). See also Restatement (Second)
of Foreign Relations Law 33-36 (1965).

1W. FRIEDMANN, THE FUTURE OF THE OCEANS 30-31 (1971).
'Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. 116:
The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent

merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it
is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal
State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other

States depends upon international law.
Id. at 132.
6
1d. at 116:
In this connection, certain basic considerations inherent in the nature of the territorial
sea, bring to light certain criteria which, though not entirely precise, can provide courts

with an adequate basis for their decisions. .

..
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prolongation of coastal State authority. 7 Nevertheless, at least one
State, Canada, has been unwilling to hazard its Arctic maritime coastal
zone to the uncertainties of existing international law and has withdrawn
its consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the international court over
8
disputes arising out of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act.
The principle of freedom of the high seas is also contained in Article
22 of the Convention on the High Seas.' This provision codified the
Among these considerations, some reference must be made to the close dependence
of the territorial sea upon the land domain, It is the land which confers upon the coastal
State a right to the waters off its coasts.
Finally, there is one consideration not to be overlooked, the scope of which extends
beyond purely geographical factors: that of certain economic interests peculiar to a
region, the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage.
Id. at 133.
7North
Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany v. Netherlands) [1969] I.C.J. 3:
[Tihe rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes
a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipsofacto and
ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise
of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural
resources.
Id. at 22. Additional references to the international status of the high seas may be found in The
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) [19491 I.C.J. 4 and The Case of the S.S.
"Lotus" (France v. Turkey) [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A. No. 10.
'Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, I STAT. OF CAN. c. 47 (1969-70), reprinted in 9 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'LS 543-52 (1970). Letter from the Canadian Ambassador to the Secretary General of
the United Nations, April 7, 1970, in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 598-99 (1970). Expositions of the
Canadian position will be found in Beesley, Rights and Responsibilities of Arctic. Coastal States:
The Canadian View, 3 J. MARIT. L. & COMM. 1 (1971); Gold, Pollution of the Sea and
International Law: A Canadian Perspective, 3 J. MARIT. L. & COMM. 13 (1971); Wilkes,
International Administrative Due Process and Control of Pollution - The Canadian Arctic Waters Example, 2 J. MARIT. L. & COMM. 499 (1971); Legault, The Freedom of the Seas: A License
to Pollute?, 21 ToRoNTo L.J. 173 (1971). Cf. Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1970).
'Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 80.
Article 22
I. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship
which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the high seas is not justified in boarding
her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting:
(a) That the ship is engaged in piracy; or
(b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or
(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag the ship is,
in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
2. In the cases provided for in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) above, the warship may
proceed to verify the ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under
the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board the ship,
which must be carried out with all possible consideration.
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0 but made
customary international law respecting piracy (de lege lata),1
new law respecting the slave trade (de legeferenda)." Nevertheless, the
effect of the principle of absolute freedom of the high seas when applied
to the problem of oil pollution of the oceans is either anarchic or misleading.
It is the argument of this discussion that although world orderprefers
a multilateral solution to the Environmental problems caused by oil
pollution, nevertheless the same world order will not condemn unilateral
solutions which will have the necessary effect of extending coastal State
interference with navigation and trade on the high seas.

"Interference", means the exercise of a right at least to stop and
detain a vessel, inquire about ownership, port of destination, port of
loading, registration and insurance. It may also mean the exercise of a
right to search and interrogate closely concerning all aspects of the
voyage. Finally, it may mean the exercise of a right to board and man
or to tow the offending vessel into a port of the offending vessel's flag
State or a port of the flag of the intercepting warship. In that latter port
an investigation for the purposes of transmission to the offending vessel's flag State could be conducted but no proceedings in the nature of
Prize"2 could be held. The related word "intervention" has been used
since 1969 in the narrower context of post-casualty actions by States.
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not
committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that
may have been sustained.
Thereafter, Article 23 makes provision for the hot pursuit of a vessel suspected of violations of
law from the territorial waters of the coastal state to the high seas.
'"See Articles 46 and 38-45 (defining piracy) of the Draft Articles adopted by the International
Law Commission at its Eighth Session A/CoNF. 13/L.17/Add. 1. See also the Summary Records
of the Second Committee (High Seas: General Regime), A/CoNF. 13/40 at 78-93 and the Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings, A/CONF. 13/38 at 2-22.
"During the middle years of the nineteenth century bilateral conventions for the suppression of
the slave trade were negotiated by European nations. The United Kingdom engaged with Portugal,
Spain, Holland, Sweden, Brazil, France, Denmark, Sardinia, Russia, Austria, Prussia and the
United States between 1814 and 1862. These treaties provided for reciprocal rights of stopping and
searching vessels in order to suppress the trade. See discussion of this in I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 732-35, (8th ed. H. Lauterpach 1955).
However it proved to be impossible to negotiate reciprocal rights of visit and search in a
multilateral context. See the 1926 Convention on the Suppression of Slavery Convention, September 26, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253. M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 3, at 879-85; C.
COLOMBOS, supra note 3, at 457-63.
On the Geneva 1958 Law of the Seas Conference see Articles 46 and 37 of the Draft Articles
adopted by the International Law Commission at its Eighth Session A/CONF. 13/L.17/Add. I.
See also the Summary Records of the Second Committee (High Seas: General Regime), A/CoNF.
13/40 at 78-93 and the Summary Records of Plenary Meetings, A/CONF. 13/38 at 20-22.
"2The Prize Jurisdiction of Admiralty courts is a proceeding in rem against enemy property
captured during the existence of a state of war by a warship of the flag state of the Prize Court.
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Before the First World War a few examples of interference on the
high seas by States other than the flag State of the vessel could be found:
suppression of piracy by the law of nations; 3 suppression of the slave
trade by bilateral agreement; the 1839 bilateral and the 1882 multilateral Convention on North Seas Fisheries; 15 the 1884 multilateral Cable
Convention;" and the 1911 multilateral Convention on Pelagic Seals in
the Bering Sea. 7 Nevertheless, the attitude of international jurists remained to the effect that these anomalous provisions represented exceptions to the general rule of freedom of the high seas.
It is believed that an emerging rule of International Law, supported
by the 1969 Convention on High Seas Intervention in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties 8 certainly permits endangered coastal States 9 to
See 4 E. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY 318-42 (6th ed. A. Knauth 1940). See

also Knauth, Prize Law Reconsidered, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 69 (1946).
"Supra, note 10. See also In re Piracy, Jure Gentium [1934] A.C. 586; United States v. Smith,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
'I L. OPPENItEIM, supra note 1I.
"The bilateral treaty of 1839 between the United Kingdom and France and the six nation
multilateral 1882 Convention for the Regulation of the Police of the Fisheries in the North Sea
Outside Territorial Waters Articles XXIX and XXX made special provisions for mutual and
reciprocal rights of visit and search within the scope of the agreements. See First Schedule to the
North Sea Fisheries Act. of 1883, 46 & 47 Vict., c.22. See also D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF FISHERIES 358-365 (1965). It is understood that the power of arrest was seldom used.
Aglen, Problems of Enforcement of Fisheries Regulations, PROC. OF 2ND ANNUAL CONF. OF LAW
OF FILE SEA INST. 19-22 (1967).

"Convention for Protection of Submarine Cables, March 14, 1884, 24 Stat. 989 (1885), T.S.
No. 380. This Convention of 1884 has been in effect since May I, 1888; thirty-eight States presently
being bound. Although Article VIII provides that offenders will be punished under the law of the
flag of the vessel causing the wilful or negligent breaking of cables, nevertheless, Article X creates
a right in the warships of Contracting Parties to board and inspect suspected vessels other than
warships of Contracting Parties. The principles of the 1884 Treaty were incorporated in the 1919
Treaty of Versailles. See generally 53 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 157-

78 (1959-60).
' TConvention for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals in the North Pacific Ocean, July
7. 1911, 37 Stat. 1542 (1911), T.S. No. 564. Article I provides for trial of offenders before the
flag state only, but also provides that warships of Contracting Parties have the right to seize
suspected merchant ships of the other Contracting Parties, except within the territorial jurisdiction
of one of the Parties. The 1911 Convention has been replaced by the Interim Convention on
Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, Feb. 9, 1957, [1957] 2 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 3948;
314 U.N.T.S. 105.
"Draft International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties, Nov. 28, 1969. I J. MARIT. L. & COMM. 367-73. Article I of the Convention
provides:
I. Parties to the present Convention may take such measures on the high seas as may
be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their
coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil,
following upon a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which may
reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.
2. However, no measures shall be taken under the present Convention against any
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take action to interfere with the operations of polluting vessels outside
of territorial water and that this justification, in the absence of a specific
treaty right, will also be available for States not directly endangered.
This seems to be a very dangerous assertion in the light of the command
of the UN Charter that nations refrain from the use of force in
international relations.2 0 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the dynamic
growth of international concern and positive international norms during
the short period of time" in which oil pollution of the oceans has been
a problem will provide the necessary justification for such action. It is
not necessary to attempt to make analogies to the universal crimes of
piracy and slavery. Rather, there is an emerging principle of international law being produced by the continuous search for new solutions
to the environmental problem as each preceding solution, inhibited by
excessive cautions which pacify vigorous protests by industrial, financial
and insurance interests, demonstrates its ineffectiveness.
Unfortunately it can never be determined whether the 1969 Intervention Convention codified or expanded customary law.
In an international forum, such as a denial of justice claim by a vessel
warship or other ship owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only
on government non-commercial service.
See also Cundick. High Seas Intervention: Parameters of Unilateral Action, 10 SAN DIEGO L.
RiV. 514 (1973).
"The discussion of the problem based on customary international law depends on the sovereign
right of self protection or self defense. Teclaff, International Law and The Protection of the Oceans
From Pollution, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 529 (972); Hardy, International Control of Marine
Pollution, II NAT. RES. J. 296 (1971); Dinstein, Oil Pollution by Ships and Freedom of the High
Seas. 3 J. MARIT. L. & COMM. 363 (1972); Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FORDHAM L.
REV. 155 (1968); Goldie, International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution. 9 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 283 (1970). See also R. BILDER, THE ROLE OF UNILATERAL STATE ACTION IN
PREVENTING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL INqJURY (Sea Grant Technical Report 1973); L.
HYDEMAN & W. BERMAN, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MARITIME ACTIVITY (1960);

and Falk, Inability of the Traditional Forms of Political Order to Adopt to Modern Problems of
International Pollution, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11 (1970).
"U.N. CHARTER art 2:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article I, shall

act in accordance with the following Principles.
4. All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter . ..
"Petroleum was not an important energy source for the propulsion of merchant vessels until after
the First World War. Prior to that war most vessels were coal burning, the age of sail having
gradually come to an end in the closing years of the nineteenth century. Losses by enemy action
in the First World War were considerable and the replacement vessels used oil for propulsive
purposes: the number of oil burning vessels in Lloyd's Register of Shipping, Register Books, having
increased from 501 in 1914 to 3,822 in 1925.
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owner, the State that seeks to protect the oceans from polluting vessels
of other flags must not be guilty of an excess or abuse of power; accordingly, the exercise of State power on the high seas must be accompanied
22
by such reasonable and salutary restraints as the circumstances permit.
A restraint already found in the 1969 Convention on High Seas Intervention in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties is the requirement of the
coastal State to pay compensation to the extent of the damage caused
by measures exceeding those necessary to mitigate or eliminate grave
danger to the coastline. 23 This provision closely resembles the provisions of private law concerning the liability of the persons asserting a
defense of self-defense or the defense of third persons when there has
been an abuse of the defense.2 4 A reasonable restraint which might be
imposed on the State not directly endangered might be the requirement
to pay compensation for any property actually damaged, in the sense
of physical but not economic loss, when such State interferes on the high
2

Article IIIof the 1969 Draft International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, supra note 17 provides:
When a coastal State is exercising the right to take measures in accordance with
Article I,the following provisions shall apply:
(a) before taking any measures, a coastal State shall proceed to consultations with other
States affected by the maritime casualty, particularly with the flag State or States;
(b)the coastal State shall notify without delay the proposed measures to any persons
physical or corporate known to the coastal State, or made known to it during the
consultations, to have interests which can reasonably be expected to be affected by those
measures. The coastal State shall take into account any views they may submit;
(c) before any measure istaken, the coastal State may proceed to a consultation with
independent experts, whose names shall be chosen from a list maintained by the Organization:...
Article V of the Convention provides:
I. Measures taken by the coastal State in accordance with Article I shall be proportionate to the damage actual or threatened to it.
2. Such measures shall not go beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the
end mentioned in Article I and shall cease as soon as that end has been achieved; they
shall not unnecessarily interfere with the rights and interests of the flag State, third
States and of any persons, physical or corporate, concerned.
3. In considering whether the measures are proportionate to the damage, account
shall be taken of:
(a) the extent and probability of imminent damage if those measures are not
taken; and
(b) the likelihood of those measures being effective; and
(c) the extent of the damage which may be caused by such measures.
2'd.
Article VI, which provides:
Any Party which has taken measures in contravention of the provisions of the present
Convention causing damage to others, shall be obliged to pay compensation to the extent
of the damage caused by measures which exceed those reasonably necessary to achieve
the end mentioned in Article I.
"2RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 73-76 (1965). See also Perkins, Self Defense Re-examined,
I U.C.L.A. L. REv. 133 (1954).
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seas with vessels which represent a danger of pollution damage to the
ocean environment."5 Another reasonable restraint to be imposed on the
State not directly endangered might be the requirement for such State
to prove actual risks or even certainty of danger to the ocean environment. The right of a State not directly endangered to make regulations,
based on potential dangers to the entire ocean environment, would be
dubious and might be rejected as an unreasonable interference with the
freedom of the high seas in the absence of multilateral authority.
At the present time the international problems of vessel pollution are
dealt with conceptually in a fragmented manner. Deliberate oil spills
that are part of ordinary vessel operations, regardless of damage, are
treated under one set of treaties which have barely inhibited such operations. Accidental spills resulting in damage are treated under another
set of treaties whereby the vessel owner is primarily liable and the cargo
itself is secondarily liable through a compensation fund. State action by
way of self-defense will be permitted to coastal states under another
treaty. Of course, this fragmentation is the result of historical development and does not reflect an approach which is necessarily logical.
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

1922 TO 1967
Ever since petroleum became an important energy source for the
propulsion of vessels during the First World War, it has been recognized
as a dangerous polluter of the ocean environment and there has been a
continuous record of international concern about the problems of oil
pollution from vessels. This concern has produced international legislation of increasing effectiveness despite concerted opposition from industry and public indifference.
In 1922 the United States Congress requested President Harding to
call a conference of the maritime powers for the purpose of discussing
effective means to prevent pollution of navigable waters.26 The background of the call was a series of port fires, ascribed to polluted, oilladen waters, especially a destructive one in Belfast, Northern Ireland.
EFFORTS FROM

"There is no analogy from private law directly applicable. The defense of Public Necessity is a
complete defense, without the requirement for payment of compensation. U.S. v. Caltex, Inc., 344
U.S. 149 (1952). Contra Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate (1964)2 All E. R. 348. The defense
of Private Necessity is not a complete defense. Compensation must be paid for damage done in
conferring a benefit. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124, N.W. 221
(1910): RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§ 197 and 263 (1965). See also Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality, 39 HARV. L. REV.

307 (1926).
2"42 Stat. 821-22 (Pub. Res., No. 65 of July 1, 1922).
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There were also the complaints of local shellfish industries and conservationists who were beginning to notice the appearance of the tarred
residues of crude petroleum upon the beaches paralleling the major sea
lanes. An interdepartmental committee of government experts prepared
an extensive report27 for the Conference, which was finally convened by
President Coolidge in 1926 in Washington. It was attended by representatives of thirteen maritime powers.2 " The Conference produced a Draft
Convention which did not accept the United States position in favor of
complete prohibition of oil discharge from sea-going vessels. Instead, a
system of zones of the high seas varying from 50 to 150 nautical miles
from the coast, and therefore extending beyond territorial waters, in
which deliberate discharge would be prohibited of oil or oily mixtures
if the oil content exceeded .05 of one percent, sufficient to constitute a
film on the surface visible to the naked eye in daylight.29 Enforcement
was left to the flag state only which was under an international obligation to use all reasonable means to obtain compliance from their merchant fleets.
To encourage compliance by what was essentially a private industry
in 1926, States were to enact incentive legislation by way of exemptions
from tonnage dues to encourage the installation of separators which
would remove the necessity for deliberate discharge of ballast sea water
from cargo tanks. However, the Conference did not go so far as to
require the installation of such separators even in new construction. 0
The Convention never achieved the necessary five ratifications and
never became effective. We can speculate that the reasoning behind the
failure to ratify was the continuation of many old vessels without separators, operated with marginal capital in cut-throat competition during
a time of serious depression in world shipping preceding the great crash
of 1929.
Several years after the Washington Conference the subject of oil
pollution was referred by the United Kingdom to the League of Nations'
Communication & Transit Organization. After two meetings of experts
who used the experience of the 1926 Conference, the Organization prepared a new draft convention; 3 however, the proposed international
1Interdepartmental
Comm., Report to the Secretary of State on Oil Pollution of Navigable
Waters (1926). This valuable document summarizes the statutes and port rules then in effect in
the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Scandinavia, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands.
" United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan.
2
1Preliminary Conference on Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters (1926) T.S. No. 736-A.
:uld. 438-40.
:1L.N. Rep. No. C/449/M/235 - 1935 - VIII of Oct. 26, 1935.
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conference to be held under League of Nations auspices was never held
due to the onset of political crises leading to the Second World War.
After the War the Charter of the United Nations presupposed that
specialized agencies responsible for a wide range of economic problems
would be established in relationship with the United Nations by means
of agreements with the specialized agencies (to be established by multilateral convention). 2 In 1948 the Economic and Social Council was
authorized to conduct such negotiations with a preparatory group 33
attempting to establish the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO). In February-March, 1948 the Conference to
draft the multilateral convention to establish the organization was held
in Geneva. Negotiations with the U.N. were concluded in that year, and
the draft agreements were approved by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly at that time. 4 However, because of
political disputes and economic differences concerning the international
status of flag of convenience shipping,35 the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization was not actually established until the
entry into force of its multilateral convention in 1958.36 Although the
subject of oil pollution regulation would certainly be within the broad
scope of the activities of the organization,37 the United Kingdom government was finally persuaded that the subject matter was too important to postpone until IMCO should be established. Therefore, the British Government called an international conference in 1954 to consider
oil pollution of the oceans, using as a basis of its work a study and
questionnaire prepared by the Economic and Social Council. 8
12U.N. CHARTER art. 57.
'The preparatory group was the United Maritime Consultative Council, established in 1946,
a successor group to the wartime organization, the United Maritime Authority. See 8 BRITISH
SHIPPING LAWS, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF MERCHANT SHIPPING 1249-53 (N. Singh
1963). The preparatory group consisted of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece,
India, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. The Geneva Conference on the multilateral convention was attended by 32 members and several observers, however,
the socialist nations did not participate in any of these preliminary activities. The first five ratifications (Canada, Greece, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States) were quickly achieved,
but the I.M.C.O. Convention required the ratifications of 21 States, of which 7 must have a total
tonnage of 1,000,000 gross tons of shipping. See Article 60 of the Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, infra note 36.
-"The Economic and Social Council approved the draft agreement on August 27, 1948. See
E/1064 of August 31. 1948. and the General Assembly approved the draft agreement on November 18, 1948. See 1950 U.N.Y.B. 1007-8 and 1949 U.N.Y.B. 969-70.
"Advisory Opinion on the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, [19601 I.C.J. 150.
"Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, March 6, 1948,
[1958] U.S.T. 621: T.I.A.S. No. 4044: 289 U.N.T.S. 48.
"Id. art. I.
'U.N. Does. E/CN. 2/100 (1951) and E/CN 2/134 (1952).
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The London Conference of May, 1954 was concerned with deliberate
discharges of oil and oily mixtures from vessels operating within zones
of the high seas in which such discharges would be prohibited. The
Conference prepared a draft convention which went into effect four
years later on July 26, 1958.11 The scope of the Convention is restricted
to non-naval vessels over 500 tons of gross tonnage.'" Although actual
prosecution for violation was reserved to flag states4 and no state other
than the flag state was to have the right to interfere with suspected
polluters on the high seas,4" there was a concession to coastal state
demand for strict enforcement in a provision permitting Contracting
Parties to board suspected vessels of other Contracting Parties while in
port in order to examine the Oil Record Book.4 The flag state (assuming it to be a Contracting Party) would be obligated to conduct an
investigation of charges and to prosecute promptly, if, ". . . the Government in the territory of which the ship is registered is satisfied that
sufficient evidence is available in the form required by law to enable
proceedings against the owner or master of the ship to be taken ...
"I'
There is a further obligation on Contracting States to insure that the
penalties on flag shipping for ocean discharges in forbidden zones be at
least as severe as the penalties for discharges in territorial waters. 5 The
key provision concerning deliberate spills is the system of zones in which
deliberate spills would be forbidden entirely. A very slight intrusion
into the area of ship construction control was the requirement that all
ships shall be ". . . so fitted as to prevent the escape of fuel oil or heavy
diesel oil into bilges the contents of which are discharged into the sea
"9 nternational Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954,
[1961] 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3. At present forty-seven states are
signatories thereto, of which France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Liberia,
Netherlands, Norway, U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S.A. are major maritime powers.
"old.art. If. Whaling vessels and certain lake vessels were also excluded.
"Id. art. X.
'lid. art. 111 (3).
"Id. art. IX (2).
"Id. art. X (2) It was the expectation of the drafters that a prima facie case where a deliberate
spill was involved might be made by the Oil Record Book, a new business record required to be
kept on all vessels within the scope of the Convention. See Annex B. to the Convention.
'"Id. art. VI.
"Id. Annex A to the Convention. All sea areas within 50 miles from land were prohibited zones,
and special regimes prohibiting discharges 30 miles from the coasts on the Adriatic Sea, 100 miles
from coasts of the North Sea and the northeast Atlantic and 150 miles from portions of Australia
were established. While there are analogies to contiguous zones approved in the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958 [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. Nevertheless, Article 24 of that convention restricts its applicability to
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations. See generally Wulf, Contiguous Zones for
Pollution Control, 3 J. MARIT. L. & COMM. 537 (1972).
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without being passed through an oily water separator."4 7 Another novel
obligation of Contracting Parties was the duty to construct and maintain facilities at each port to handle oily wastes."
The Convention did not deal with civil liabilities, but rather with
penal or quasi-penal proceedings against the vessel, her owner and master, by the flag state. Nevertheless, the Convention did provide for
emergency precautions to prevent or minimize the escape of oil following accidental damage or unavoidable leakage. 9 These latter provisions
certainly appear to foresee the situation where a party injured by a
discharge in a prohibited zone is attempting to use the penal statute as
the standard of care in a negligence action.5 " Dissatisfaction with the
regulatory aspects of this Convention soon led to demands for amendments even before the Convention became effective.
In 1958 at the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea a decision
was made to add a provision imposing an affirmative duty on all states
"to draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas by the discharge
of oil from ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and
exploration of the seabed and its subsoil, taking account of existing
''51
.
treaty provisions ...
111d. art. VII.
"Id. art. VIII.
4
"Id. art. IV. The formulation of the defendant's burden of proof resembles that of the carrier's
defense in the Warsaw Convention of International Aviation, article 20. International Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, October 12,
1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1929), T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. I1.
'"However, the Convention is not self-executing in the sense that no further action by the
legislature would be necessary to establish the penal responsibility. See generally W. PROSSER, THE
LAW O: TORTS, 190-204 (4th ed. 1971); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence
Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 21 (1949). In most jurisdictions of the United States unexcused
violation of a regulatory statute is negligence per se. However, in Admiralty, under the rule of The
Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873), the party accused of a statutory violation must prove
that the violation did not and could not have contributed to the loss. Whether this rule can be
extended beyond its traditional limits of collisions and strandings is questionable. In re Seaboard
Shipping Corp., 449 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied 406 U.S. 949 (1972); Petition of Long,
439 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1971); cf. In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied 409 U.S. 982 (1973).
5
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 9 art. 24. It is generally considered that this convention is a codification of preexisting law rather than the development of new law. See Preamble to
the Convention, "The States Parties to this Convention, Desiring to codify the rules of international law relating to the high seas..." The Conference adopted the provisions of the Draft of
the International Law Commission (art. 48) without change. See Summary Record of Proceedings
in the Second Committee, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 13/40 at 92, and was accepted without debate by
the Plenary. See Summary Record of Plenary Meetings, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 13/38 at 22. One
of the Preparatory Documents for the Conference was "Pollution of the Sea by Oil," U.N. Doe.
A/CONF. 13/8 prepared by the Secretariat in addition to an earlier study by the United Nations
Secretariat, "Pollution of the Sea by Oil," U.N. Doe. ST/ECA/41 (1956).
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The 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by
Oil became the responsibility of IMCO in 1958 and a preliminary conference was held in 1959 to tighten the 1954 Convention." Finally, in
1962 under IMCO auspices a Second London Conference on Oil Pollution of the Seas was held which produced a series of amendments to the
1954 agreement.5" The prohibited zones were extended to 100 miles
from the nearest land in the northwest Atlantic, the northeast Atlantic,
the Mediterranean Sea with the Adriatic and Black Seas, the Red Sea
and the Indian Ocean with the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and the Bay
of Bengal and the 150 mile Australian zones were extended further
along the coast.54 The eventual goal of a complete prohibition of deliberate discharges was to be achieved by ship construction controls: a requirement that new vessels of more than 20,000 tons of gross tonnage
built after the effective date of the Convention be forbidden to discharge
oil anywhere in the world unless the retention of the oil is "neither
reasonable nor practicable." 5 5 Previously constructed ships were not
required to be altered; however, the system of prohibited zones is to be
tied into the reinforced obligation of states to construct facilities to
receive oily wastes from ships other than tankers. Vessels travelling to
ports with such facilities are forbidden to make deliberate discharges
inside the prohibited zones. 51 These amendments came into force in
1967.
A second set of amendments were made in 1969 s1 and a complete
revision was effected in 1973.18 Thus, as of March 1967, when the Torrey
Can von broke up after grounding in the high seas, there was a fortyfive year history of international concern with the problems of deliberate
oil pollution of the oceans and a rudimentary series of international
12Coordinating Advisory Committee on Oil Pollution, Proceeding of the International Conference on Oil Pollution of the Sea, Copenhagen, 1959.
'Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, Amendments to Convention of 1954, adopted April
II,1962, [19661 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332 (effective May 18,1967, as
to arts. I-X, XVI & XVII; effective June 28, 1967, as to art. XIV.) [Hereinafter 1962 Oil Pollution
Convention.]
lid. Annex A.
"-'ld.
art. 111(c).
"'Id. art. 111(b) (to be applicable three years after the effective date). Tankers are forbidden to
discharge within the prohibited zones, art. 1it(a). A distinction is made between other ships under
500 gross tons and tankers under 150 gross tons, and tanker vessels above 150 gross tons and other
ships above 500 gross tons are brought within the Convention. Art. 1I(l)(a).
"Amendments to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by
Oil, as amended October 21, 1969, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1 (1970). This is a composite text of
the 1954, 1962 and 1969 texts.
"lnternational Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, open for signature, Jan.
15, 1974, IMCO Doc. MP/CoNF/WP. 35 (1973); 12 INT'L. LEGAL MAT'LS 1319 (1973).
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regulations. The focus of attention now shifted to accidental spills during the maritime transport of the petroleum.
III.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS SINCE

1967:

ACCIDENTAL SPILLS AND

MONETARY DAMAGES

In 1967, as for the previous eighty years, there was no permanent
international maritime organization to deal with all aspects of the uses
of the seas. In 1889 the International Marine Conference met in Washington to prepare the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Thereafter, until the organization of IMCO, technical
conventions concerned with ship operations such as load-lines,5" safety
of life at sea and ship construction, ° and rules of the road 6 were prepared as public law conventions with heavy government participation.
In 1897 the Comite Maritime International (hereinafter C.M.I.) was
organized in Belgium and over the years prepared a series of thirteen
private law conventions, which were essentially concerned with shipowners' liabilities or non-liabilities. The subject matters were collision damages," salvage, 3 limitation of shipowners' liability,64 carrier liability
under bills of lading for cargo damage," arrest of vessels in civil cases6
"International Convention Respecting Load Lines, July 5, 1930, 47 Stat. 2228 (1930), T.S. No.
848, 135 L.N.T.S. 301. This Convention has been replaced by the International Convention on
Load Lines, April 5, 1966, [1967] 2 U.S.T. 1857; T.I.A.S. No. 6331; 640 U.N.T.S. 133. A closely
ielated subject is the Convention for a Uniform System of Tonnage Measurement, June 10, 1947.
N. Singh, supra note 33 at 633.
"0lnternational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, May 31, 1929, 1929 A.M.C. 993. This
convention was replaced by the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, June 10,
1948 19521 3 U.S.T. 3450, T.I.A.S. No. 2495, which has now been replaced by the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, June 17, 1960, [1965] I U.S.T. 185, T.I.A.S. No. 5780,
536 U.N.T.S. 27.
"lnternational Regulations for Preventing Collisions At Sea, incorporated in International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, June 10, 1948, and now incorporated as Annex B to the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, June 17, 1960. [1965] I U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S.
No. 5813. It is anticipated that new rules will become effective in 1976.
"2 nternational Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Respect to Collisions between Vessels, September 23, 1919. N. Singh, at 1047 (1963). The United States has
never ratified this Convention, essentially because of the provisions eliminating the joint and several
liability of the vessel owners to cargo damaged or lost because of collision. See Sweeney,
Proportional Fault in Both to Blame Collisions, STUDI IN ONORE DI GIORGIO BERLINGIERI 549
(1964).
"International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law respecting Assistance
and Salvage at Sea, September 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658 (1913), T.S. No. 576.
"International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Limitation of
Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels, August 25, 1924, N. Singh, supra note 33 at 1058.
The United States has not ratified either of these conventions. Revision will be undertaken by
I MCO in 1975.
"lnternational Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of
Lading, August 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233 (1924), T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155. Partial Revision
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and maritime liens and ship mortgages." These conventions were
drafted by the various national private maritime law associations of
admiralty lawyers and marine insurers with diplomatic conferences
being called by the Belgian government to prepare the international
conventions.
After 1958 IMCO proceeded cautiously and correctly to exercise its
technical functions. Environmental protection was not the proper sphere
of any international organization, certainly not IMCO or the C.M.I.,
and public awareness of pollution risks and disasters was not great.
In March 1967 the Torrey Canyon, a jumboized tanker, precursor of
much larger tankers then being built and planned, broke up in the high
seas off the Cornwall coast of Great Britain and caused a spill of
35,000,000 gallons of crude oil to spread along the English Channel to
pollute important resort areas in England and France. 8 This spill received dramatic treatment in the press, and the hesitation of the British
government in handling the stricken vessel emphasized the failings in
domestic and international controls. Unfortunately, The Torrey Canyon
spill was the first in a series of oil pollution disasters: The Ocean Eagle
at San Juan; the Delian Apollo at Tampa Bay; The Arrow at Chedabucto Bayn, N.S.; the Santa Barbara Channel Drilling Spill; and the
San Francisco Bay collision of two Standard Oil vessels, so that public
excitement was unable to subside owing to the regularity of occurrence.
In April 1967 the British government submitted a note to the Third
Extraordinary Session of the IMCO Council suggesting immediate consideration of technical measures that would prevent future disasters69
and proposed changes in the international maritime law: vessel owner
of this Convention was attempted at Conferences in 1967-68 but the so-called Brussels Protocol
(originally the Visby Rules) has not come into force. An extensive revision is now underway by an
UNCITRAL Working Group.
"International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Seagoing Ships, May 10, 1952, N. Singh,
supra note 33 at 1126. The United States has not ratified this Convention.
"7International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Maritime
Liens and Mortgages, April 10, 1926, N. Singh, supra note 33 at 1087. The United States has not
ratified this Convention. A new Convention has been drafted by the C.M.I. at its Plenary Session
in New York in 1965.
"See generally E. COWAN, OIL AND WATER: THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968); Sweeney,
Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 155 (1968); Nanda, The Torrey Canyon
Disaster.Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENVER L.J. 400 (1967). The Report of the Liberian Board of
Investigation is found at 1967 A.M.C. 569.
69
1MCO Doc. C/ES. 111/3 of April 18, 1967. The suggested technical measures were: mandatory
sea lanes, speed restrictions near land, shore radio control of offshore tankers and additional
navigational aids, limitations on the use of automatic pilots, special training for tanker masters
and crews, design control of tankers, special markings for tanker routes and periodic equipment
tests.
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liability independent of negligence; changes in the limitation of shipowners liability convention; compulsory insurance; and provisions concerning clean up costs. Responding to these far-reaching suggestions the
IMCO Council referred the technical measures to appropriate committees and established a legal committee to review the British proposals. 0
The C.M.I. also established an international subcommittee, under the
chairmanship of Lord Devlin to report with recommendations. 7'
During the next two and a half years there was an extensive debate,
often simultaneously in domestic and international settings, concerning
the legal issues and various alternative solutions raised by the maritime
transport of petroleum. The debate continues to this day.
There are two independent centers of activity with two widely differing clienteles in which extensive debates over the pollution problem are
now heard. In IMCO the clientele is ship operators and those nations
dependent upon maritime transport in their international trade.72 In the
General Assembly of the United Nations where effective power under
the one nation one vote system73 is in the hands of the developing states
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the clientele is not yet effectively
involved in maritime transport. Accordingly, the General Assembly has
proven to be a far more sensitive forum for proposing radical solutions
to environmental problems, especially while the General Assembly is
engaged in a comprehensive review of important international maritime
questions such as mineral resources of the ocean bottom, the breadth
of the territorial sea, and the delimitation of the continental shelf.
Thus far IMCO has produced a two-tier system of compensation for
oil spill damage, a convention codifying the right of endangered coastal
states to intervene in pollution danger on the high seas, and an amendment and revision of the deliberate spill convention. The General Assembly has not yet produced a new text and must await the outcome of
the 1974 Caracas Law of the Sea Conference or its possible sequel in
Vienna in 1975 to determine further expansions of the rights of coastal
states to combat pollution dangers.
70

IMCO Doc. C/ES. 111/5 of May 8, 1967.
Preliminary Report to an International Subcommittee of the International Maritime Committee (Torrey Canyon) of August 25, 1967. See also C.M.I. Doc. 1968, III, TC-3/2-68 for the
questionnaire and answers submitted to the national maritime law associations by the C.MI.
72The November, 1969 meeting of the IMCO General Assembly was attended by the forty nine
nations who were then members. Since that meeting the membership has expanded to 75 nations.
Every major maritime power is a member of IMCO.
7'U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 2; art. 9, para. I; art. 18, para. I. The membership of the United
Nations in 1973 was 135.
7
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The Two Tier Compensation System

In November 1969 IMCO considered a draft convention which had
been prepared as a result of cooperation between the IMCO Legal
Committee and C.M.I. 74 The most difficult topics concerned the nature
of the liability and the amount to which that liability could be limited.
The nature of the liability is really the problem of defenses, i.e., if no
defenses are permitted to the enterprise that has caused the damage, it
is an absolute liability. If a restricted number of defenses centering
around the concept of inevitable accident or "vis maior" are permitted,
it is a strict liability. Whereas if a large number of defenses, including
the concept of concurring negligence, is permitted, then it is a fault
liability. The threat of enormous damages can be seen as a necessary
incentive to guarantee careful operations, but if the damages from any
one incident were permitted to be recoverable without limit, there is
danger that the pollution risk might become uninsurable.
The Convention on Civil Liability75 is based on fault, but the vessel
owner has the burden of proving non-fault rather than the pollution
claimant attempting to prove fault.7" The liability for negligent or deliberate spills can be limited to 2000 gold francs or $134 (1969) per ton77
of net limitation tonnage up to a maximum amount of 210,000,000 gold
"The C.M.I. had proceeded by its normal method: questionnaire, circulation of answers, informal committee discussion, preparation of a draft document, formal discussions to revise the draft
and an international diplomatic conference. See Sweeney supra note 62. Following receipt of
eighteen responses to the C.M.I. questionnaire, in which twelve national associations approved
retention of the existing fault liability, a draft convention was prepared and approved by the C.M.I.
Plenary in its April 1969, Conference in Tokyo. This draft was considered in Working Group il
of the IMCO Legal Committee (Working Group I dealt with public international law questions)
and the draft convention which was considered by the IMCO General Assembly in November 1969,
can be said to be ajoint effort of I MCO and C.M.I. See generally, Healy, The C.M.I. and IMCO
Draft Conventions on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution, I J. MARIT. L. & COMM. 93 (1969) and
Mendelsohn, Miaritinze Liability for Oil Pollution -Domestic and International Law, 38 GEo.
WASI. L. REv. I (1969).
-Draft International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, November 28,
1969, 9 INT'L LEGAl MAT'!S 45 (1969); 1J. MARIT. L. & COMM. 373 (1970).
7
"ld. art. 111(2) provides:
No liability for pollution damage shall attach to the owner if he proves that the damage:
(a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irrestible character, or
(b) was wholly caused by an act of omission done with intent to cause
damage by a third party, or
(c) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any Government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other
navigational aids in the exercise of that function.
77
1d. art. V(I) and (9). The gold franc referred to is a Poincare franc, an artificial currency based
on gold defined as, "a unit consisting of sixty five and a half milligrams of gold of millesimal
fineness nine hundred."
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francs or $14,000,000 (1969). The limitation fund is to be established in
a court of the state where the pollution damage has occurred.78 Evidence
of financial responsibility of insurance must be carried by every vessel
which carries more than 2,000 tons of oil cargo.79 Anxiety about the
relatively low limitation of liability in the Convention centered about the
belief that the cleanup costs and property damage from the Torrey
Canyon had been about $16,000,000 and the Torrey Canyon was a
relatively small ship when compared with the new tankers being built
with cargo carrying capacity five times that of the Torrey Canyon.5 0
This anxiety was partially assuaged by a resolution of the Conference
to establish an international fund, collected from charges upon cargoes
of petroleum, that would provide coverage for pollution damages in
excess of those for which the vessel owner was being held responsible."
The final vote to approve the 1969 Convention reflected 34 in favor,
10 abstentions and I opposed (Canada). The Canadian position objected
to the orientation of the provisions in favor of ship and cargo owning
interests and away from environmental protection."'
The 1971 Convention on the Compensation Fund was a direct out711 have used the figures of $134 and $14,000,000 as 1969 United States equivalents. Since 1969
there have been two devaluations of the U.S. dollar (December 1971 & February 1973) and many
currencies have been freed to float with the free market value of gold. The official price of gold in
the United States in 1969 was $35 per ounce, however, after August 15, 1971, convertibility into
gold ceased. The official price of gold after the February 1973, devaluation was $42. per ounce,
however, as of March 1974, the free market price of gold was fluctuating between $165 and $179
per ounce.
,91969 Civil Liability Convention, art. VII.
'"A U.N. Secretariat study estimated that between 1961 and 1971 total world production of
petroleum increased from 1,162 to 2,478 million tons; the world tanker tonnage increased from 67
to 175 million tons DWT; the total number of tankers increased from 2,270 in 1951 to 6,292 in
1971 and the average size of tankers has more than doubled, the largest tanker in service in 1950
being 30,000 tons and in 1971 the largest tanker in service being 477,000 tons. A. Andreev,
Activities of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization in the Field of Prevention
and Control of Operational and Accidental Pollution Emanating from Ships, in HAZARDS OF
MARITIME TRANSIT, 29 (T. Clingan & L. Alexander eds. 1973). See also Schachter and Serwer,
Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies, 65 A.J.I.L. 84 (1971).
"Resolution on Establishment of an International Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 66 (1969) [hereinafter Resolution]. Resolutions on International
Cooperation Concerning Pollutants other than Oil and Procedures for the Fund Convention were
also appended to the text of the Convention. See 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 65, 67 (1969). See
generally Hunter, The Proposed International Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, 4
J. MARIT. L. & CoMM. 117 (1972); Doud, Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage: Further
comment on the civil liability and compensation fund conventions, 4 J. MARIT. L. & COMM. 525
(1973).
2
Gold, Pollution of the Sea and International Law: A Canadian Perspective, 3 J. MARIT. L. &
CoMm. 13, 27-29 (1971). See also Henkin, Arctic Anti-Pollution: Does Canada Make-or Break
-International Law? 65 A.J.I.L. 131 (1971).
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growth of the Resolution" framed at the 1969 Conference on Civil
Liability as a compromise position for those nations, like the United
States, which had urged a stricter liability with a much larger limitation
fund. 8 Those nations considered the goal of the fund conference to be
a method to compensate all victims of oil pollution damage to 100%
of their actual loss. Shipowning States on the other hand had argued
that it was unfair to impose the entire pollution liability on the shipowner and that the cargo itself should become directly liable for such
losses. In the United States there was criticism of the low limits of vessel
liability as compared with the recently enacted Federal Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970."5
A comparison of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention with the 1970
United States statute is in order at this time to analyze the depth and
nature of domestic opposition to ratification of the 1969 Convention.
The Convention covers vessels carrying oil in bulk, while the statute
covers all vessels over 300 gross tons. The Convention forces all pollution damage claims into the fund, both cleanup and private damage
claims, while the statute is applicable only to government cleanup costs,
the remedies in private law against the vessel owner being untouched.
The limitation on recovery of all claims under the Convention is $134
(1969) per gross ton to a maximum limit of $14,000,000 (1969) whereas
the federal statutory fund limitation of $100 (1974) per gross ton to a
maximum limit of $14,000,000 (1974) is available for government clean
up costs alone. The nature of the liability under the Convention is
almost a strict liability with defenses of act of war, inevitable accident
or intentional conduct; the statutory liability is less strict with the above
three defenses plus the negligence of intervening parties. A positive
argument in favor of the Convention was that the liability as limited
represented a great improvement over the maximum amount of the
existing 1957 limitation of liability convention."
"Resolution, supra note 81.
"'The position of the United States government favored strict liability with a limitation fund of
$150 per registered ton to a maximum of $25,000,000. France proposed a higher limitation figure
of $175 per registered ton to a maximum of $30,000,000, while Canada, Australia and New Zealand
proposed $450 per registered ton with no maximum limitation amount.
1--84 Stat. 91, 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970). The 1970 Statute has been reenacted in 1972 under the
Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, P.L. 92-500, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1974 Supp.).
" 6lnternational Convention Relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea-going Ships,
October 10, 1957, effective May 10, 1968. Under this Convention a limitation fund is made up by
multiplying the deadweight tonnage of empty cargo spaces (limitation tonnage) by 1000 gold
francs. The United States has not ratified this Convention although'there is a provision of domestic
law permitting shipowners to limit their liability to the value of their interest in the vessel after a
disaster. 46 U.S.C. §§ 183-189 (1970).
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In November 1971 the governments of 49 States assembled at Brussels to consider a draft convention to constitute a special fund to supplement excess pollution losses not covered by the 1969 Civil Liability
Convention. Again the two most controversial questions were the maximum amount to which the liability of the fund could be limited and the
nature of the defenses which could be asserted against damage claimants.
The result of the deliberations was the provision that the fund would
not be liable to pollution claimants if the cause of the spill was "an act
of war, hostilities, civil war or insurrection" or from the use of a warship
or other noncommercial governmental vessel.87 Of course, the claimant
must prove that the pollution damage "resulted from an incident involving one or more ships."88 A limitation of Fund liability for any one
incident of 450,000,000 gold francs or $30,000,000 (1971) has been imposed.89 Nevertheless, the General Assembly of the Fund is permitted
to double the limitation figure to 900,000,000 gold francs if "having
regard to the experience of incidents which have occurred and in particular the amount of damage resulting therefrom and to changes in monetary values.""0 The Fund Convention also has a complex. system to
indemnify individual shipowners for amounts paid- out to claimants
under the 1969 Civil Liability Convention in excess of the amount to
which the liability might have been limited under the 1957 Convention"'
on the condition that the pollution damage for which indemnification
is being sought has resulted without the "actual fault or privity of the
owner. '"" Finally, the Fund is endowed with legal personality so that it
may take an adversary position against pollution claimants and shipowners in litigation.93 Accordingly, it can be seen that the goal of
compensating all victims of oil pollution damage to 100% of their actual
loss is still a distant goal.
"TDraft International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, December 18, 1971 art. 4(2)(a), 3 J.MARIT. L. & COMM. 624 (1972).
111d. art. 4(2) (b). Art. 4(3) provides that the Fund will not be liable for the contributory fault of
the claimant.
'Id. art. 4(4) (a). This is a total limitation which includes amounts which the Fund must pay by
way of indemnification.
9
°Id. art. 4(6). It should be noted that this Convention creates a new international personality,
the Fund, Art. 2(l), with all the apparatus and organizational machinery normally possessed by
international organizations: General Assembly, Secretariat headed by a Director, and an Executive
Committee. Arts. 16, 28, 21.
9
Id. arts. 2(2) and 7(4).
2
1d. art. 5. Special reliance is placed on the shipowner obligations arising under the 1954 Oil
Pollution Convention, the 1960 Safety of Life at Sea Convention, the Rules of the Road, and the
1966 Load Line Convention. Id. art. 5(3).
11 d.arts. 2(2) and 7(4).
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Private Agreements within the Maritime Transport Industry

Tanker fleet owners, who also do retail business in petroleum products, have always been sensitive to the public relations problems created
by large oil spills and have made large strides in accomodating some of
their operations to public criticism. Thus, even before the 1954 Convention mandated the pollution free zones 50 miles off-shore, there was
much voluntary compliance with the proposed prohibitions of the 1926
Conference and there were technical developments such as effective oily
waste separators which ameliorated the deliberate pollution problem.
The extensive debates on the 1969 Civil Liability Convention prompted
the industry to organize a compensation scheme to forestall increasing
public criticism. As of March 1974 the liability conventions drafted at
Brussels in 1969 and'1971 are not yet in force, but the voluntary protections and guarantees established by the petroleum transport industry
have been in force since October 6, 1969.
In the marine transport industry the vessel hull is insured to protect
the vessel owner's investment against destruction of loss and the liability
of the vessel and her owners for personal injury, property damage, cargo
loss, and damages caused by oil pollution will be insured (or indemnified) through "clubs" of shipowners which have established P & I (protection and Indemnification) agreements. Large multinational corporations often are self-insurers of their fleets. However, the practice of
reinsurance of liabilities of self-insurers and P & I clubs in excess of
$1,000,000 or more, or in alternating layers upward, is widespread.
Thus, it is apparent that reinsurers would be reached in cases of large
spills and P & I clubs would be primarily liable where the insurance is
applicable. Accordingly, a special indemnification fund to ensure voluntary cleanup of spills was established by the agreement of owners of the
major tanker fleets. The agreement comes into effect upon the occasion
of a spill, regardless of fault, up to $100 per gross registered ton to a
maximum limit of $10,000,000 for cleanup expenses undertaken by
shipowners. 4
TOVALOP (The Tanker Owners' Voluntary Agreement Concerning
Liability for Oil Pollution), administered by a new English corporation,
the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation, Ltd. was established when 50% of the privately owned fleets adhered to the agreement;
by July 1972, 99% of such fleets were parties to the TOVALOP Agree" 9Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution, 8
497 (1969), art. VI.
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ment.1 This agreement pays governmental cleanup expenses only, not
private damage claims.9"
The TOVALOP cleanup indemnity is supplemented by the CRISTAL (Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability
for Oil Pollution) fund which will provide for payments to injured private individuals because of a spill that escaped from a vessel owned or
chartered by a member of the fund.97 The maximum amount for a spill
is $30,000,000,11 to be raised by assessments on participating oil companies. Amounts paid out by tanker owners under TOVALOP and other
existing obligations will be recaptured from the total amount of the
fund. 9 The CRISTAL agreement will be phased out after the effective
date of the 1971 Fund Convention.'0 0
C.

Reform of the 1954 Convention by IMCO

The 1962 Amendments to the 1954 Oil Pollution Convention, effective in 1967, provided an efficient means for future changes to this
international legislation through the use of the IMCO General Assembly.1 01 Therefore, in 1969 further amendments to the 1954 Convention
were achieved, but again the deliberate oil spill was not prohibited. The
totality of the 1969 changes might not have any great effect on the
protection of the environment. Instead of the concept of prohibited
zones, there is substituted a ban on discharges unless they are necessary'0 2 and the necessary discharges must be in diluted form and as far
from shore as possible.0 3 Despite the continued exemption of tankers
9TOVALOP, published by the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd., January 1973 at 4.
94Resolution, supra note 81, art. IV.
9 Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution, January 14,
1971, 2 J. MARIT. L. & COMM. 705 (1971), art. IV(A).
99ld. art. IV(B).
If the total damage exceeds this sum, then it shall be pro-rated among the
claimants, art. IV(C).
9Id.
art. IV(B) (I), (2), (3) and (4).
'"Id.art. Ill(C).
'"11962 Oil Pollution Convention, supra note 53, art. XVI. This article provides that proposals
approved by a 2/3 majority of the Maritime Safety Committee are to be forwarded to a conference
convened on the call of at least 1/3 of the General Assembly. Thereafter, amendments, "shall come
into force for all Contracting Governments, except those which before it comes into force make a
declaration that they do not accept the amendment..."
'"'Oil Pollution Convention, supra note 57. Art. VII provides:
(I) As from a date twelve months after the present Convention comes into force for
the relevant territory in respect of a ship in accordance with paragraph (I) of Article
II, such a ship shall be required to be so fitted as to prevent, as far as reasonable and
practicable, the escape of oil into bilges, unless effective means are provided to insure
that the oil in the bilges is not discharged in contravention of this Convention.
(2) Carrying water ballast in oil fuel tanks shall be avoided if possible.
"ild. art. I defines the term "nearest land" to be "from the base line from which the territorial
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under 500 gross tons, the new arrangement differentiated between tankers and ships other than tankers as to the amount of diluted discharge
which would be permissible. There is a total prohibition on the discharge
by ships other than tankers of oily mixture with a content of more than
100 parts per one million parts of the mixture at a rate in excess of 60
liters per mile; diluted discharges below the prohibited level being permitted as far as practicable from land. 104 Each tanker is prohibited from
discharging oily mixture with a content of more than one fifteenthousandth part of her total cargo carrying capacity; diluted discharges
below the prohibited level being permitted more than 50 miles from the
nearest land.' ° The earlier 1954 provision concerning enforcement only
by the flag State remains in effect, although the flag State is now
required to inform IMCO as well as the complaining State of the results
of proceedings. 06
It is uncertain to what extent pressures from the 1972 Stockholm
Conference, the NATO Declaration, U.N. General Assembly Declaration and the need to forestall lengthy and divisive discussions in the 1974
Law of the Sea Conference dictated the necessity of the 1973 IMCO
Conference. Nevertheless, a wide ranging conference on the subject of
marine pollution met under IMCO auspices in November 1973 in London to consider a Draft Convention prepared since the 1971 Fund Conference. The scope of the 1973 Convention was marine pollution caused
by discharges of oil, other noxious liquid substances carried in bulk,
harmful substances not liquid but packaged, sewage, and garbage.', 7
Prior to the 1973 IMCO Conference a general prohibition of the
dumping of wastes in the ocean, to be enforced solely by the flag state,
was approved by IMCO on December 29, 1972.
At this Conference the most difficult subject was coastal state jurisdiction over the high seas and expansion of the rights of Contracting
Parties over ships of another flag. The drafters of the preparatory document presented alternative formulations of coastal state jurisdictions:'
sea of the territory in question is established in accordance with the Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958."
"'ld. art. lll(a).
'ld. art. 111(b). However, this prohibition does not apply to the discharge of ballast water,
"from a cargo tank which since the cargo was last carried therein, has been so cleaned that any
effluent therefrom, if it were discharged from a stationary tanker into clean calm water on a clear
day, would produce no visible traces of oil on the surface of the water.
nor to bilges. Art.
I1l(C).
'Ild. art. X.
' 7 nternational Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, supra note 58, Annexes
1-5.
'0 IMCO Doc. MP/CONF./4 of 23 Aug. 73, Art. IV.
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(I) the coastal state to have concurrent jurisdiction with the flag state
over discharge violations within the territorial sea but with no coastal
state jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea; (2) the flag state to have
jurisdiction over violations wherever occurring with an obligation to
prosecute wherever the violation occurred, while the coastal state is to
have jurisdiction either to prosecute violations within territorial waters
or report them to the flag state. In addition a special new jurisdiction
designated as "Port State Jurisdiction" was proposed which would involve the concurrent right with the flag state to prosecute violations on
the high seas and the concurrent right with flag and coastal states to
prosecute violations in the territorial sea. Eventually tle Conference
elected to continue the traditional approach to coastal state jurisdiction
without creating any new types of jurisdictions; such public law questions being specifically reserved for the 1974 Caracas Conference on the
Law of the Sea.'"9
With respect to high seas interference with polluting vessels there was
a proposal to permit Contracting States to "take more stringent measures, where specific circumstances so warrant, within their jurisdiction,
in respect of discharge standards" but prohibiting regulations effecting
ship design and equipment for pollution control unless the waters were
"waters the particular characteristics of which, in accordance with accepted scientific criteria, render the environment exceptionally vulnerable.""" Such provision might have preserved Canada's special Arctic
legislation and could have broader implications, however; it was not
possible to obtain the required 2/3 majority in the Plenary Session.
The decision to postpone changes in the rights of coastal states emphasizes the weakest link in the traditional international law of the high
seas-the coastal state or flag state which is either unable or unwilling
to enforce its international obligations or even its domestic requirements. Thus, the comments of Schachter and Serwer on the 1969 Convention on Coastal State Intervention and the 1969 Civil Liability Convention remain valid today."'
The burden of responsibility for acting to prevent oil pollution rests
with states, but not all states are equipped to execute this responsibility. Capping blow-outs, detecting oil spills and identifying their origin,
bombing a wrecked tanker in order to set its oil on fire, sinking an oil
slick, skimming oil from the surface of the sea and any number of
other measures which can, and which under existing and proposed
treaties should, be taken by coastal states, are all measures which
09 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, supra note 58, Art. 4.
"0 IMCO Doc. MP/CoNF. 14 of 23 Aug. 73. art. VIII.
"'Schachter and Serwer, supra note 80 at 94.
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require a considerable degree of technical expertise and extensive financial resources. This is true as well for many of the measures which
states can and should require of the vessels operating under their own
flags. Few states possess all the expertise they need or could use in this
area. It might, indeed, be wasteful if all states did individually possess
the capacity to take all possible measures for the control of oil pollution from ships .

. .

. Even wealthy countries may find it difficult to

mobilize the necessary manpower, technology and hardware ....
Despite the reluctance of the 1973 Conference to make major changes
in traditional maritime law concerning coastal state interference on the
high seas, it did take positive steps with respect to pollution prevention
through the mandated use of segregated ballast in new construction,
thereby eliminating the need to carry water ballast in empty oil tanks," 2
and new and broader provisions for the port's jurisdiction to challenge
the International Oil Pollution Certificate to be issued by the flag
state." 3 The format of the 1969 Amendments to the 1954 Convention
concerning permissible diluted discharges has been preserved for existing tankers, but the total quantity of oil for permissible discharges by
new tankers is reduced to one-thirty-thousandth part of the total cargo
carrying capacity."' Ships other than oil tankers with gross tonnage in
excess of 400 gross tons must have oil discharge monitoring and control
systems and oily water separators." 5 A new concept of "special areas"
reminiscent of the prohibited zones of the 1954 Convention has been
added." '6
D.

Rewriting InternationalLaw in the General Assembly

Among the myriad questions considered in the lengthy Seabed Debates of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and in the Assembly itself has been the question of effective protection of the coastal
zone and the ocean environment by coastal states. The debate led to the
adoption of a series of resolutions to accomplish three objectives: create
"'lnternational Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, supra note 109; Annex
I, Regulations 13-17.
"11d. art. 5(2), which provides, "Any such inspection shall be limited to verifying that there is
not aboard a valid certificate, unless there are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the
ship or its equipment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of that certificate. In
that case, or if the ship does not carry a valid certificate, the Party carrying out the inspection
shall take such steps as will ensure that the ship shall not sail until it can proceed to sea without
presenting an unreasonable threat to the marine environment."
"'Id. Annex I, Regulation 9(1) (a).
"Id. Annex 1, Regulation 9(l)(b).
"'Id.Annex I, Regulation 10.
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the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment," 7 create
the Law of the Sea Conference,"' and establish the principles of General
Assembly Resolution 2566 requesting all states to take effective measures to prevent pollution of the marine environment."' This is not the
place to discuss the lawmaking effect of hortatory Resolutions of the
General Assembly of unanimity or a near unanimity of the developing
world. Certainly a Resolution cannot create new conventional law, but
it does reflect emerging principles of customary international law. 2 0
The Stockholm Conference of 114 states in June 1972 produced a
program of international action covering some 200 points and a Declaration on the Human Environment which it is hoped will some day be
as highly regarded as the Declaration on Human Rights.' The Conference also requested the establishment of a permanent international organization to be concerned with protection of the human environment.,
Within the new Declaration on the Human Environment there are general principles which demonstrate the development of international concern with the oil pollution problem, as for example, the Statement of
Marine Principles:
States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by
substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm
living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere
with other legitimate uses of the sea.'
The same thought is enlarged in Recommendation 86e of the Action
Plan calling for the end of deliberate spills by 1975.24
As this is being written the work is still continuing for the Caracas
"'G.A. RES. 2850 (XXVI) of December 20, 1971. See also G.A. Res. 2398 (XXIII) of December
3, 1968: G.A. Res. 2581 (XXIV) of December 15, 1969; and G.A. Res. 2657 (XXV) of December
7. 1970.
"'G.A. Res. 2749 and 2750 (XXV) of December 17, 1970. See also G.A. Res. 2340 (XXII) of
December 18, 1967: G.A. Res. 2467 (XXIII) of December 21, 1968; and G.A. Res. 2564 (XXIV)
of December 15, 1969.
"'G.A. Res. 2566 (XXIV) of December 13, 1969. See also G.A. Res. 2467 (XXIII) of December
21, 1968.
2I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (2d ed. 1973). See generally 0.
ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1966).
'The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III) of December 10, 1948.
'These Resolutions of the Stockholm Conference were approved by the General Assembly at
the same time as the new United Nations Environmental Programme, to be headed by Maurice
Strong of Canada, was established at Nairobi. See G.A. Res. 2997 (XXVII) of December 15, 1972.
'General Principle 7 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14.
21
11d. Sec. 86e. On the Stockholm Conference and marine pollution, see generally, Butte,
Controlling Marine Pollution-World Task or National?, 8 STAN. J. INT'L STUDIES 99 (1973);
Thacher, Assessment and Control of Marine Pollution: The Stockholm Recommendations and
their Efficacy, 8 STAN. J. INT'L STUDIES 79 (1973); and Bramsen, Transnational Pollution and
International Law, 42 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET 153 (1972).
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Conference on the Law of the Sea. There is a serious danger of a
stalemate on ocean pollution questions. The 1973 IMCO Conference
deferred to the Law of the Sea Conference to develop new principles for
the territorial sea and the high seas with respect to environmental protection, yet the Caracas Conference will not be a conference on the
environment. There is a current of opinion among some of those preparing to attend the 1974 Conference that the pollution problem must be
solved before the problem of state competence on the high seas can be
resolved. Perhaps the patrimonial sea to a distance of 200 miles from
the coast will include a coastal state guardianship, if not a jurisdiction
based on sovereignty that will permit surveillance and even regulation
of the world's tanker fleets to prevent pollution. It is possible that a
threat of this nature could produce an accommodation by the shipowning nations which were able to prevent the pmrt state jurisdiction from
being established at the 1973 IMCO Conference. Caracas will not be
the friendly forum for these nations that IMCO has been. It is not
suggested here that the Caracas Conference invade the technical preserve that properly belongs to IMCO with respect to pollution prevention standards, but a modification of coastal state rights in the high seas
near the territorial sea and the creation of a port state jurisdiction to
enforce international pollution prevention regulations would be a positive step foward in the progressive development of international law.
Alternative solutions to the enforcement of oil pollution control devices
might be: establishment of an international force of ocean watchers to
interfere or intervene in the operations of offending vessels; revision of
the Contiguous Zone Convention to expand pollution protection zones
of coastal states over the entire ocean surface by extending the median
lines everywhere; or the establishment of the proposed port state jurisdiction in addition to existing jurisdictional rights. The latter solution
seems to be the least offensive to the existing world order of the oceans
and should be seriously considered.
CONCLUSION

The story of international control of oil pollution has been developed
here, not as an illustration of the ideal path for the development of an
effective regime for environmental safeguards, but rather as an illustration of the types of conflicting interests and compromises which will
necessarily be made as the World Community attempts to select the
most rational and just resolution of a human problem to which there
are many rational responses. Although there are many sources of environmental damage to the oceans and the coastal zone, such as sewage,
natural drainage, river systems and even the rainfall in the atmosphere
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itself, there is one source which is controllable-the ocean transport of
petroleum. Unfortunately, the efforts to control this source can imperil
one of the most important industries of industrialized economies. It is
a truism that for the foreseeable future there will be no adequate substitute for petroleum products to provide the energy for these industrialized economies. It is also a truism that oil is not now produced where
it is needed and that it is a dangerous commodity, if not actually an
hazardous commodity in a legal sense, at all stages of its production,
transportation, refinement and consumption. In such a situation there
are neither heroes nor villains, but a long slow process of accommodation to reach a viable solution. Such platitudes, however, will not resolve
the real conflicts which can occur, as for example by the 1970 Canadian
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 125 extending coastal state jurisdiction seaward one hundred nautical miles or the 1972 United States
Ports and Waterways Safety Act"2 6 which requires unilateral establishment of minimum standards for design, construction and safe operation
of liquid bulk carriers, regardless of flag.
The 1973 IMCO Convention passed difficult questions of coastal
state interference with non-flag vessels to the 1974 Law of the Sea
Conference, already overburdened with complex problems. Although
one can be optimistic that the Law of the Sea Conference will review
the necessities for coastal state interference with the maritime transport
of petroleum and devise a new regime which will accommodate all
interests, it is not probable. Therefore, the question may again return
to IMCO. It is hoped that it will receive better treatment in future
deliberations.
In the meanwhile, what is to be done with the 1969 Civil Liability
Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention? It is submitted that it would
be a mistake not to ratify these existing conventions now. In the interest
of international uniformity and the progressive development of international law they should be ratified as an incentive for further developments as they become necessary. It is not certain that the fund levels
will be insufficient or that the other inadequacies of approach will cause
widespread suffering, but it is unlikely that a better result can be
"'Supra note 8.
'Pub. L. No. 92-340, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (1974 Supp.). There is an interesting dictum in
State of Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972), that after July 1,
1974 when the Rules and Regulations for protection of the marine environment relating to vessel
design and construction safety standards will have been promulgated that a cause of action in
Admiralty on behalf of injured shoreside claimants will exist based on unseaworthiness, a type of
liability without fault.
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achieved in the IMCO forum at this time. It might be the best course
for the United States to make a reservation with respect to Article III
(4) of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention which provides: "No claim
for compensation for pollution damage shall be made against the owner,
otherwise than in accordance with this Convention . . . ." If reservation is not attempted or permitted, then the later treaty will become the
supreme law of the land over the earlier (1972) provision of the Federal
Water Quality Improvement Act and the (1972) Ports and Waterways
127
Safety Act.
The conflicts between the domestic and international norms are not
very great and, having made the appropriate reservation, the United
States Congress could then reenact the earlier cleanup law which would
become the supreme law of the land.' 28 Perhaps one might be even
bolder and propose that the United State should ratify the 1969 and
1971 Conventions without reservations and then reenact the old cleanup law and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act,2 9 following Canada's
example and trusting in the emergence of a rule of international law
which will give broad powers of protection of the ocean heritage to
coastal states and to the World Community.
127Cook v. United States (The Mazel Tov), 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
"'2 Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
'Cook v. United States (The Mazel Toy), 288 U.S. 102 (1933). Such legislation might leave
the United States liable in an international forum for a denial of justice to a foreign shipowner
who has suffered harm because of the difference between the domestic legislation and the treaty
commitment. See generally A. FREEMAN, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL
OF JUSTICE (1938): Lillich, Toward the Formulation of an Acceptable Body of Law Concerning
State Responsibility, 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 721 (1965). On the modern approach to reservations
in multilateral agreements see K. HOLLWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW (1967).

